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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is twofold: (i) we will argue that formal semantics
might have faltered due to its failure in distinguishing between two fundamen-
tally very different types of concepts, namely ontological concepts, that should
be types in a strongly-typed ontology, and logical concepts, that are predicates
corresponding to properties of, and relations between, objects of various onto-
logical types; and (ii) we show that accounting for these differences amounts to
a new formal semantics; one that integrates lexical and compositional semantics
in one coherent framework and one where formal semantics is embedded with a
strongly typed ontology; an ontology that reflects our commonsense knowledge
of the world and the way we talk about it in ordinary language. We will show
how in such a framework a number of challenges in the semantics of natural
language are adequately and systematically treated.
Key words: Commonsense knowledge; Background knowledge; Strongly-
typed ontology; Language understanding; Formal semantics
1 Introduction
In the concluding remarks of Ontological Promiscuity , Hobbs (1985) made what we
believe to be a very insightful observation: given that semantics is an attempt at
specifying the relation between language and the world, if “one can assume a theory
of the world that is isomorphic to the way we talk about it . . . then semantics
becomes nearly trivial”. But how exactly can we rectify our logical formalisms so that
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semantics, an endeavor that has occupied the most penetrating minds for over two
centuries, can become (nearly) trivial, and what exactly does it mean ‘to assume a
theory of the world’ in our semantics?
In this paper, we hope to provide answers for both questions. First, we believe that
a commonsense theory of the world can (and should) be embedded in our semantic
formalisms resulting in a formal semantics grounded in commonsense metaphysics.
Moreover, we believe that the first step to accomplishing this vision starts by rectifying
what we think was a crucial oversight in formal semantics, namely the failure to
distinguish between two fundamentally different types of concepts: (i) ontological
concepts, that are types in a strongly-typed ontology; and (ii) logical concepts, that
are predicates corresponding to properties of and relations between objects of various
ontological types. By embedding ontological types in our predicates, type unification
and other type operations can then be used to ‘uncover’ missing information, i.e.
information that is never explicitly stated in everyday discourse, but is often implicitly
assumed as shared background knowledge.
In the next Section, we first discuss what we call the ‘missing text phenomenon’
(MTP) that–we argue–is behind most challenges in the semantics of natural language.
We will then discuss the difference between ontological and logical concepts, and how
acknowledging this difference effectively translates into embedding a commonsense
theory (knowledge) of the world into our logical formalism. Subsequently, it will be
demonstrated how differentiating between logical and ontological concepts can indeed
make semantics become ‘nearly’ trivial by first suggesting how type unification over
predicates embedded with various ontological types can help us ‘uncover’ all the miss-
ing text, i.e. text that is never explicitly stated but is usually implicitly assumed as
shared background knowledge. Subsequently, we will show how several challenges in
the semantics of natural language (e.g., lexical disambiguation, metonymy, copredi-
cation, etc.) can be adequately and uniformly treated by accounting for the missing
text. Before we proceed, however, we define here what we mean by two important
phrases that are mentioned throughout in this paper:
Commonsense knowledge: That knowledge that is available for a 4-year old, and not
the sort of domain specific knowledge that might be needed in problem solving
in specific domains; e.g., ‘trees don’t walk’, ‘it is not sensible to say articulate
table’; in ‘The White House issued a warning to North Korea’ The White House
is a reference to the president and his administration, not the building, etc.
Background knowledge: That knowledge that is not explicitly stated in everyday
discourse but is implicitly assumed to be shared by speaker and listener. For
example, a bartender hearing a waiter in a bar saying ‘the corner table wants
another beer’ knows that it is ‘[the person sitting at] the corner table that wants
another beer’ and specifically because of the shared background knowledge that
people and not tables drink beer; that the most salient relationship between a
person and a table is the ‘sitting-at’ relation, etc.
2 The Missing Text Phenomenon (MTP)
Linguistic communication happens, crudely, as follows: a thought is encoded by a
speaker into a linguistic object (in some language), and the listener then decodes
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the linguistic object into (hopefully) the thought the speaker intended to convey. In
this complex process, there are several alternatives how this can happen: (i) on one
extreme, the speaker can compress (and minimize) the amount of information sent
in the encoding of the thought and hope that the listener will do the extra work in
the decoding (uncompressing) process to get at the message being conveyed; or (ii)
the speaker will do the hard work and send all the information needed to convey the
thought, which would leave the listener with little to do (a detailed description of this
process can be found in Kirby et al., 2015).
The natural evolution of this process, it seems, has resulted in the right balance
where the total work of both speaker and listener is optimized. That optimization re-
sulted in the speaker encoding the minimum possible information that is needed, while
leaving out everything else that can be safely assumed to be information that is avail-
able for the listener–information that we usually call common background knowledge.
While this genius optimization that has developed in about 200,000 years of evolution
works quite well for humans, it is also precisely why natural language understanding
(NLU) is difficult: machines do not know what we leave out and implicitly assume
as shared background knowledge. To illustrate how this ‘missing text phenomenon’
(MTP) manifests itself in well-known challenges in NLU, consider the examples below
where the missing text is highlighted in bold:
lexical ambiguity
I like to play bridge
⇒ I like to play [the game] bridge
hidden relations
Mary enjoyed the (sandwich | movie)
⇒ Mary enjoyed ([eating] | [watching]) the (sandwich | movie)
quantifier scope ambiguity
BBC has a reporter in every country
⇒ BBC has a [different] reporter in every country
prepositional phrase attachments
Jon had pizza with (pineapple | his kids)
⇒ Jon had pizza ([topped] | [together]) with (pineapple | his kids)
metonymy
The corner table wants another beer
⇒ [the person sitting at] the corner table wants another beer
metaphor
Don’t worry about Peter, he’s a rock
⇒ Don’t worry about Peter, he’s [solid like] a rock
nominal compounds
Jon works in the (computer | neighborhood) store
⇒ Jon works in the (computer [-selling] | neighborhood [-located]) store
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copredication
Jon threw the newspaper after he read its criticism of globalism
⇒ Jon threw the [physical-object] newspaper after
he read its [informational-content] criticism of globalism
What all the above indicates is that most challenges in NLU are due to the challenge
in uncovering all the information that is not explicitly stated but is often assumed as
shared (and common) background knowledge. As noted by Levesque (2011) in the
context of the Winograd Schema Challenge, in order to have a full understanding
of ordinary spoken language “you need to have background knowledge that is not
expressed in the words of the sentence to be able to sort out what is going on . . .
And it is precisely bringing this background knowledge to bear that we informally
call thinking” (emphasis in original).
In formal semantics, however, there has been quite a bit of work in recent years to
develop type-theoretic semantics to deal with some instances of this phenomenon. For
example, in a series of papers (see e.g. Lou, 2010; 2011; 2012) Lou introduces a type
system based on Martin-Löf’s type theory (Martin-Löf, 1984) where common nouns
are considered to be types, and where it is shown how the machinery of type coercion
can in such a system handle lexical disambiguation as well as accommodate for what
is referred to as copredication (see Pustejovsky, 1995), which occurs when an object
is predicated in different ways in the same context. For example, the context in (1)
is one where ‘book’ is used in two senses in the same context: as the physical object
(when being ‘bought’) and as an informational content (when being ‘read’):
(1) John bought and read the latest book on deep learning
While we are sympathetic to the general approach of Lou, we believe that copredica-
tion and lexical ambiguity are in fact part of the same and much simpler phenomenon,
and thus we believe that copredication and type coercion introduce complex machin-
ery unnecessarily, not to mention that type shifting/coercing will not always produce
the desired results. The same observation can be made about the work of Asher and
Pustejovsky (2012) where complex machinery that permits type shifting is used to
access different aspects (senses) of a structured object (or a dot-type, that represents
all possible senses) using lexical constraints available in the context. The problem
we have with this approach is that the notion of a dot-type does not seem to be
cognitively plausible, not to mention that, in theory, language allows us to pick many
aspects of a given object that cannot a priori be defined as part of the lexical se-
mantics, but must be dynamically (compositionally) figured out (we will see this in
some detail below). Moreover, and more specific to the work of Lou, we argue that
there is in fact a technical problem in assuming that the entire class of common nouns
should constitute the types in the system. For example, while nouns such as ‘man’
and ‘bank’ can reasonably be treated as types, this will not do in situations where
the common noun is a role noun (e.g., teacher), as illustrated in (2).
(2) John is an excellent teacher
In (2), it is not ‘John’ (the teacher) that is excellent, but John’s teaching (activity)
instead.
Starting with (Asher, 2008; 2011) and more recently (Asher, 2015), Asher has
also developed over a few years a type system that is aimed at incorporating some
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commonsense metaphysics through a typed system. While the same reservations we
have regarding the approach taken by Lou (2012) more or less apply to the earlier work
of Asher, the more recent Asher (2015), however, correctly highlights the technical
problems in simply performing type shifts (or type coercion), and in particular in
examples such as those in (3).
(3) Julie bought a book. It was a mystery.
If a straightforward type shifting is performed on the first sentence, so that the type
constraints imposed by ‘enjoy’ (which expects a physical-object) are satisfied, then
the subsequent sentence cannot be correctly interpreted as we would have lost, so to
speak, the informational-content sense of book that is the obvious referent of ‘it’.
Asher concludes, and correctly so, in our opinion, that it is not type shifting of book
that must occur, but that some process in predicate composition must occur. That
process, which Asher (2015) calls ‘transformation,’ is essentially a functor (a function
object, something similar to a lambda expression, in computing lingo), that ‘picks-up’
the desired object sense that can semantically link to the verb’s argument. We are
in agreement with the spirit of this approach but we have two reservations. For one
thing, this ‘transformation’ operation is not very clear, especially in how it picks-up
different kinds of objects, e.g., an eventuality (a ‘reading’) in (4) and ‘informational
content’ in (5):
(4) Julie enjoyed the book ⇒ Julie enjoyed reading the book
(5) Julie criticized the book ⇒ Julie criticized the content of the book
Moreover, and if types are meant to be a set of general categories (such as physical-
object, informational-content, animate, etc.), it is not clear how it can be
determined that in (6) it was Barcelona’s residents who voted for independence
(6a), that it was Barcelona’s team that lost to Real Madrid (6b), and that it was
Barcelona’s governing body that announced a curfew (6c).
(6) Barcelona was calm after it

a. voted for independence
b. lost to Real Madrid
c. announced a curfew
The reason this highly general (and somewhat ad-hoc) type system is potentially
problematic is that all the [missing terms] in the examples in (6) are, at a high
level, of a similar type, namely some ‘group of people’ and thus for our pragmatics to
work it must operate at a much more granular level, as we will see below.
To summarize, the recent efforts to incorporate type-theory in compositional se-
mantics in an effort to integrate lexical semantics with compositional semantics is a
welcoming trend, and the pioneering work of Pustejovsky (2012), Lou (2011), and
Asher (2015) are indeed efforts in the right direction. But these approaches lack gen-
erality, as we discussed above. Moreover, these approaches are limited to one or two
phenomena, but do not offer a general framework that suggests how the root prob-
lem of uncovering the missing and assumed text can be solved. The problem, in our
opinion, lies in our logical formalism. In particular, we believe that formal semantics
faltered due to how predication has been used to represent both, genuine predicates,
as well as types, and it is precisely this subtle oversight that is at the source of many
‘apparent’ challenges in formal semantics.
44 J. Knowl. Struct. Syst., 1:1
Original research Language and its Commonsense W. S. SABA
3 Ontological vs. Logical Concepts
We begin by making the case for a very crucial aspect to our proposal, namely distin-
guishing between ontological concepts (that are types in a strongly-typed ontology)
and logical concepts (that are predicates that represent the properties of and the
relations that hold between objects of various ontological types).
3.1 Types vs. Predicates
In Types and Ontology , Fred Sommers (1963) suggested that there is a strongly typed
ontology (that he termed ‘the language tree’) that seems to be implicit in all that
we say in ordinary spoken language, where two objects x and y are considered to be
of the same type if and only if (abbr.: iff) the set of monadic predicates that are
significantly (that is, truly or falsely, but not absurdly) predicable of x is equivalent
to the set of predicates that are significantly predicable of x . Thus, for example, while
the noun phrases in (4) make reference to four distinct sets of objects, for an ontologist
interested in the relationship between ontology and language, the noun phrases in (7)
are ultimately referring to two types only, namely Cat and Number:
(7) a. an old cat
b. a black cat
c. an even number
d. a prime number
In other words, whether we make a reference to an old cat or to a black cat , in both
instances we are ultimately speaking of objects that are of the same type; and this,
according to Sommers, is a reflection of the fact that the set of monadic predicates in
our natural language that are significantly predicable of old cats is exactly the same
set that is significantly predicable of black cats (or, whatever can sensibly be said
of black cats can also be sensibly said of old cats, and vice versa). In this sense, a
concept such as old is a predicate that happens to be predicable of a concept such
as Cat, which corresponds to a type in a strongly-typed ontology.1 As such, we take
the proper logical representation for the noun phrase in (8) to be that in (8b), and
not the one in (8a).
(8) Jan adorable catK
a. ⇒ λP [(∃x)(cat(x ) ∧ adorable(x ) ∧P (x))]
b. ⇒ λP [(∃x :: Cat)(adorable(x ) ∧P (x))]
That is, ‘an adorable cat’ refers to some adorable object of type Cat. Note also that
abstract objects, such as events, states, properties, etc. are also types in the ontology
and can also be predicated, as shown in (9).
1As Hacking (2001) suggests, one can think of a type such as Cat to be the kind of object that
is an answer to a question such as ‘What-is-it?’ Thus the distinction between types and predicates
might be related to Kant’s analytic/synthetic distinction, where the truth of a type judgment such
as (Sheba :: Cat) is a synthetic judgment the truth of which is determined by virtue of what we know
about the world; while the truth of the judgment wild(Sheba :: Cat) is determined by virtue of the
meaning of wild; i.e. by what we take wild to mean. As such, all entities in our system are object
of a certain type, including abstract objects such as events, activities, properties, states, etc. Thus,
there are no ‘teachers’ in our ontology, but objects of type Human that might be the agents of some
teaching event.
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(9) Jan imminent eventK ⇒ λP [(∃x :: Event)(imminent(x ) ∧P (x))]
Jan idle stateK ⇒ λP [(∃x :: State)(idle(x ) ∧P (x))]
Ja desirable propertyK ⇒ λP [(∃x :: Property)(desirable(x ) ∧P (x))]
In our representation, therefore, we assume a Platonic universe that includes every-
thing we talk about in our language, and where concepts belong to two quite distinct
categories: (i) ontological concepts, such as Animal, Substance, Entity, Artifact, Book,
Event, State, etc., which are types in a subsumption hierarchy, and where the fact
that an object of type Human is (ultimately) an object of type Entity is expressed as
Human v Entity; and (ii) logical concepts, such as former, old, imminent, beauti-
ful, etc., which are the properties (that can be said) of, and the relations (that can
hold) between, ontological concepts. The following are examples that illustrate the
difference between logical and ontological concepts:
(10) R1 : older(x :: Entity)
R2 : heavy(x :: Physical)
R3 : hungry(x :: Living)
R4 : articulate(x :: Human)
R5 : make(x :: Human, y :: Artifact)
R6 : manufacture(x :: Human, y :: Instrument)
R7 : ride(x :: Human, y :: Vehicle)
R8 : drive(x :: Human, y :: Car)
The predicates in (10) are supposed to reflect the fact that in ordinary spoken language
we can say old of any Entity; that we say heavy of objects that are of type Physical;
that hungry is said of objects that are of type Living; that articulate is said of
objects that must be of type Human; that make is a relation that can hold between
a Human and an Artifact; that manufacture is a relation that can hold between
a Human and an Instrument, etc. Note that the type assignments in (10) implicitly
define a type hierarchy as that shown in Figure 1. Consequently, and although not
explicitly stated in (10), in ordinary spoken language one can always attribute the
property heavy to an object of type Car since Car v Vehicle v Physical, where v
should be read as ‘subtype-of.’2
In addition to logical and ontological concepts, there are also proper nouns, which
are the names of objects that could be of any type. A proper noun, such as Sheba, is
interpreted as follows: JShebaK⇒ λP [(∃1Sheba :: Thing) (P (x))].
A point worth mentioning at this early juncture is that besides the embedding
of ‘commonsense’ constraints in our predicates, what implicitly gets defined by ap-
plying Sommers’ predicability test, as given by (10), is the implicit determination of
‘saliency.’ For example, and while it makes sense in our everyday discourse to speak
of Human objects that make, ride and drive objects of type Car, drive is a more
salient relation between a Human and a Car, since a Human rides a car as a Vehicle,
and makes a car as an Artifact, but drives a car explicitly as a Car (see Fig. 2). We
will discuss this in more detail below.
2It should be noted here that the expressions in (10) are assumed to refer to a specific sense of
each predicate. In general, however, the type assignment is a set of possible types where a single
type is eventually left after lexical disambiguation. This will be discussed in more detail below.
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Figure 1: The type hierarchy implied by the type assignments in (10).
Figure 2: Salient relations implied by the ontological types and their properties.
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3.2 Type Unification
Let us now start our ‘compositional’ semantics. Consider the interpretation of Sheba
is a thief , where we assume thief is a property that is ordinarily said of objects that
must be of type Human, that is thief(x :: Human):
JSheba is a thiefK⇒ λP [(∃1Sheba :: Thing)(thief(Sheba :: Human))]
Thus, Sheba is a thief is interpreted as: There is a unique object named Sheba
(initially assumed to be of type Thing), such that the property thief is true of Sheba.3
Note now that in (11) Sheba is associated with more than one type in a single
scope. In these situations a type unification must occur, where a type unification
(S • T) between S and T and where Q ∈ {∀,∃}, is defined for now as follows:
(11) Q (x :: (S • T)) (P (x))
≡

Q (x :: (S)) (P (x)) , if (Sv T)
Q (x :: (T)) (P (x)) , if (Tv S)
Q (x :: (S))Q (x :: (T)) (P (x) ∧R (x, y)) , if (∃R) (R = msr (S,T))
⊥, otherwise
where msr (S,T) stands for the most salient relation between objects of type S and
objects of type T. That is, in situations where there is no subsumption relation be-
tween S and T the type unification results in keeping the variables of both types and
in introducing some salient relation between the two types (we will discuss these sit-
uations below). Going back to (11), the type unification in this case is actually quite
simple, since (Human v Thing):
(12) JSheba is a thiefK
⇒ (∃1Sheba :: Thing)(thief(Sheba :: Human))
⇒ (∃1Sheba :: (Human • Thing)(thief(Sheba))
⇒ (∃1Sheba :: Human)(thief(Sheba))
In the final analysis, therefore, Sheba is a thief is interpreted as follows: there is a
unique object named Sheba, an object that eventually came out to be of type Human,
such that thief is true of Sheba. Note the clear distinction between ontological
concepts (e.g., Human), which Cocchiarella (2001) calls first-intension concepts, and
logical (or second-intension) concepts, such as thief(x :: Human). In accordance with
Quine’s famous slogan (“to be is to be the value of a variable”), what (12) says is that
what ontologically exist are objects of type Human, and not thieves, and thief is an
accidental (and temporal, etc.) property that we came to use to talk of certain objects
of type Human. Furthermore, it is assumed that a logical concept such as thief is
defined by a logical expression such as (∀x :: Human)(thief(x )≡ φ), where the exact
nature of φ might very well be susceptible to temporal, cultural, and other contextual
factors, depending on what, at a certain point in time, a certain community considers
a thief to be.
3For simplicity, we are ignoring for now some intermediate steps in the translation, especially as
it relates to the copula ‘is’ which plays an important part in determining the correct predication
(more on this below).
48 J. Knowl. Struct. Syst., 1:1
Original research Language and its Commonsense W. S. SABA
It should also be noted that a first-intension such as (x :: Human), as well as a
second-intension such as articulate(x :: Human), are both ‘judgments’ where the
former is a type judgment and the latter is a value judgment. As such, in the interpre-
tation of ‘John is articulate’ the first-intension (x :: Human) must precede the second-
intension articulate(x :: Human), unlike the ‘in-parallel’ evaluation human(John)
∧ articulate(John) we usually get in standard first-order logic. Another way of
stating this is that for a judgment such as articulate(x :: Human) to be made, the
judgment (x :: Human) must first be made. The way we see it, therefore, is that type
judgments are the first level in the entire semantic structure, as suggested in Figure
3 below.
Figure 3: Levels of semantic processing.
3.3 More on Type Unification
Consider the following (initial) interpretation of Sara owns a black cat , where we
assume black(x :: Physical) and own(x :: Human, y :: Entity)–that is, we assume
that black can be said of objects of type Physical, and that the own relationship
holds between objects of type Human and objects of type Entity:
(13) JSara owns a black catK
⇒ (∃1Sara :: Thing)(∃c :: Cat)(black(c :: Physical)
∧ own(Sara :: Human, c :: Entity))
Thus Sara owns a black cat is initially interpreted as follows: there is a unique Thing
named Sara, and some object c of type Cat, such that c is black (and thus in this
context it must be of type Physical), and Sara owns c, where in this context Sara
must be an object of type Human and c an object of type Entity. Depending on the
context they are mentioned in, therefore, Sara and c are assigned different types:
initially considered to be a Thing, Sara is then considered to be an object of type
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Human (when the agent of an ‘owning’ relationship). The object c, on other hand,
is assigned three types in a single scope: introduced as an object of type Cat, it is
then considered to be an object of type Physical (when predicated by black) and as
an Entity (when the object of an ‘owning’ relation). The type unifications that must
occur in this situation are the following (where ‘→’ means ‘unifies to’):
(Sara :: (Thing • Human))
→ (Sara :: Human)
(c :: (Physical • Entity) • Cat))
→ (c :: (Physical • Cat))
→ (c :: Cat)
The final interpretation of Sara owns a black cat is finally given by the following:
(14) JSara owns a black catK
⇒ (∃1Sara :: Human)(∃c :: Cat)(black(c) ∧ own(Sara, c))
That is, there is a unique object named Sara, which is of type Human, and some
object c of type Cat, where c is black and Sara owns c.
3.4 Type Unification and Abstract Objects
As discussed above, logical concepts such as teacher, thief, etc. are assumed to
be defined by some logical expression. A plausible (although admittedly simplistic)
definition for a logical concept such as dancer could for example be given by (15).
(15) (∀x :: Human)(dancer(x ) ≡ ∃a :: Dancing)(agent(a, x))
That is, any x (that must be of type Human) is a dancer iff x is the agent of some
Dancing (which is a subtype Activity). Let us now consider the interpretation of Olga
is a beautiful dancer , where we assume beautiful(a :: Entity), i.e. ‘beautiful’ can be
said of any Entity:
(16) JOlga is a beautiful dancerK
⇒ (∃1Olga :: Thing)(∃a :: Dancing)
(agent(a :: Activity, Olga :: Human)
∧ (beautiful(Olga :: Entity) ∨ beautiful(a :: Entity)))
Thus, Olga is a beautiful dancer is initially translated as follows: there is a unique
Thing named Olga, and some Dancing a, where Olga is the agent of this dancing,
which must be an Activity (and as the agent, Olga must be of type Human), and
where either Olga is beautiful or her Dancing (or of course, both) is. Note now that
in the same scope Olga and the dancing activity a are assigned three types, triggering
the following type unifications:
(Olga :: ((Thing • Entity) • Human))
→ (Olga :: (Entity • Human))
→ (Olga :: Human)
(a :: ((Dancing • Activity) • Entity))
→ (a :: (Dancing • Entity))
→ (a :: Dancing)
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Concerning the disjunction term in (16), representing the ambiguity in nominal mod-
ification, we now have the following beautiful(Olga :: Human) ∨ beautiful(a ::
Dancing)). Since both terms in the disjunction are acceptable, the final translation
is the one given in (17) that admits an ambiguity in nominal modification, i.e. the
possibility of ‘beautiful’ describing Olga or her dancing (or both).
(17) JOlga is a beautiful dancerK
⇒ (∃1Olga :: Human)(∃a :: Dancing)
(agent(a, Olga) ∧ (beautiful(Olga) ∨ beautiful(a)))
Unlike the situation in (13), however, the relevant type unifications should remove
the ambiguities in (18) and (19),
(18) Olga is an experienced dancer
(19) Olga is a recreational dancer
where it is clear that experienced is describing Olga in the former and recreational
is describing Olga’s dancing in the latter (that is, in (14) it is Olga and not her
dancing that is ‘experienced’, and in (15) it is not Olga, but her dancing that is
‘recreational’). The only term we need to consider here is the term involving the
disjunction representing the ambiguity in nominal modification. Here are the type
unifications in the case of (18):
experienced(Olga :: (Human • Human)) ∨ experienced(a :: (Dancing • Human))
→ experienced(Olga :: Human) ∨ experienced(a :: ⊥)
→ experienced(Olga :: Human) ∨⊥
→ experienced(Olga :: Human)
The type unification admitting an ‘experienced dancing’ fails here, leaving ‘experi-
enced’ to unambiguously modify Olga. In (19), however, we have the following:
recreational(Olga :: (Human • Dancing))
∨ recreational(a :: (Dancing • Dancing))
→ recreational(Olga :: ⊥) ∨ recreational(a :: Dancing)
→ ⊥∨ recreational(a :: Dancing)
→ recreational(a :: Dancing)
Note that in this case the type unification removes ‘recreational Olga’ leaving ‘recre-
ational’ to unambiguously modify Olga’s dancing. One might at this point question
why the type unification (Dancing • Human) in (18) and (19) was considered a failure
(resulting in ⊥), although the definition of type unification given in (11) suggests
that in the absence of a subsumption relation between two types S and T, an attempt
is first made to pick-up the most salient relation (msr) between the two ontological
types. The answer is that looking for an msr occurs when all else fails, while this
is not the case in (18) and (19), where the local context provided a successful type
unification and thus looking elsewhere to ‘make sense’ of what is being said is not
needed!
3.5 Failed Terms as Failed Type Unifications
Recall the interpretation of Olga is a beautiful dancer in (16), where the final inter-
pretation admitted the ambiguity in nominal modification, since all type unifications
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succeeded, allowing ‘beautiful’ to remain ambiguous in that it could be modifying
Olga or her Dancing. Let us now consider the interpretation of Olga is a beautiful tall
dancer , where we assume tall(x :: Physical):
(20) JOlga is a beautiful tall dancerK
⇒ (∃1Olga :: Thing)(∃a :: Dancing)
(agent(a :: Activity, Olga :: Human)
∧ (beautiful(tall(Olga :: Physical) :: Entity)
∨ (beautiful(tall(a :: Physical) :: Entity)))
The type unifications required here are the following:
(Olga :: ((Thing • Physical) • Human))
→ (Olga :: (Physical • Human))
→ (Olga :: Human)
(a :: ((Dancing • Activity) • Physical))
→ (a :: (Dancing • Physical))
→ (a :: ⊥)
→ ⊥
resulting in (21):
(21) JOlga is a beautiful tall dancerK
⇒ (∃1Olga :: Human)(∃a :: Dancing)
(agent(a, Olga)
∧ (beautiful(tall(Olga :: Human))
∨ (beautiful(tall(a :: ⊥) :: Entity)))
⇒ (∃1Olga :: Human)(∃a :: Dancing)(agent(a, Olga)
∧ (beautiful(tall(Olga)) ∨⊥))
⇒ (∃1Olga :: Human)(∃a :: Dancing)(agent(a, Olga)
∧ (beautiful(tall(Olga)))
Unlike the situation in (16), where ‘beautiful’ could be describing Olga or her dancing,
the situation in (17) is quite different due to the adjective ‘tall’ that forced ‘beautiful’
to be describing a physical object, and thus Olga, and not her Dancing.
We leave it to the reader to work out why (and how) Olga is a beautiful tall dancer
sounds fine, while Olga is a tall beautiful dancer sounds awkward (hint: in the latter,
the type castings and type unifications reduce the entire disjunction to ⊥!)
3.6 What ’Paradox of the Ravens’?
Before we continue showing the utility of our framework, we briefly detour to show
how our ontological semantics can help us solve some longstanding logical/semantic
puzzles.
Introduced in the 1940’s by Carl Gustav Hempel, then a student of Carnap,
the Paradox of the Ravens–or Hempel’s Paradox, or the Paradox of Confirmation
(Hempel, 1945)–has continued to occupy logicians, statisticians, and philosophers of
science to this day. The paradox arises when one considers what constitutes an evi-
dence for a statement (hypothesis) and it can be described by the following:
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(22) H1: All ravens are black
H2: All non-black things are not ravens
Hypothesis H1 is logically equivalent to hypothesis H2, as is typically shown in the
following translation in standard first-order predicate logic:
(23) H1: (∀x)(raven(x ) ⊃black(x ))
H2: (∀x)(¬black(x ) ⊃¬raven(x ))
The assumed ‘paradox’ is now due to the irreconcilability of the following, separately
valid claims: (i) any observation of an instance that satisfies H1 is said to confirm H1
(to some degree); and (ii) any observation that confirms a hypothesis H1 must confirm
(and to the same degree) a hypothesis that is logically equivalent to it; and (iii) the
observation of any non-black thing that is also not a raven confirms H2, and thus,
it confirms the logically equivalent hypothesis H1. This, however, leaves us with the
unpleasant conclusion that observing a white shoe, a blue shirt, or, for that matter,
any non-black and non-raven object currently in your sight, confirming ‘all ravens are
black.’ Clearly, this cannot be accepted, since the observation of a red herring, say,
has no bearing on the hypothesis that ‘all ravens are black.’
Many solutions have been proposed to the Paradox of the Ravens that range from
accepting the paradox (that observing red apples and other non-black non-ravens does
confirm the hypothesis ‘All ravens are black’–since the observation does not disconfirm
it), to proposals in the Bayesian tradition that try to measure the ‘degree’ of confir-
mation. Concerning the latter, Bayesian proposals essentially amount to proposing
that observing a red apple, for example, does confirm the hypothesis ‘All ravens are
black’ but it does so very minimally, and certainly much less than the observation of
a black raven (see Vranas, 2004). Clearly, however, this is not a satisfactory solution,
since observing a red flower should not contribute at all to the confirmation of ‘All
ravens are black.’ Worse yet, it turns out that in the Bayesian analysis the observa-
tion of black but non-raven objects actually negatively confirms the hypothesis that
‘All ravens are black,’ which is also problematic. An even more serious flaw in the
Bayesian analysis is this: if observing a red apple confirms the hypothesis that ‘All
ravens are black’ (no matter how minutely), then it also minimally, but equally, con-
firms the hypothesis that ‘All ravens are green.’ Thus, we have the same observation
that confirms two mutually exclusive hypotheses, which clearly is unacceptable (see
Maher, 1999, for a more detailed discussion).
What we suggest here is that the purported ‘paradox’ is not a logical one, but a
representational one. In particular, we believe that the problem lies in the standard
first-order predicate logic formulation of the hypothesis and its contrapositive. Let us
suggest embedding ontological types in the standard Montague (1974) representation,
where we are assuming black(x :: Physical), i.e. black is a property that is ordinarily
said of objects of type Physical.
We will start first with H1, namely the hypothesis All ravens are black. Note the
crucial step (24.3), where unifying the term (x :: Raven) with the variable introduced
by the quantifier reduces the term (x :: Raven) to true, and thus the meaning of All
ravens to λQ[(∀x :: Raven)(Q(x ))]. In (24.7), the term black(x :: Physical) forces a
type unification (Raven • Physical), resulting in the final interpretation of All ravens
are black as (∀x :: Raven)(black(x ))–that is, for any object x of type Raven, black
is true of x .
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(24) 1. JAllK⇒ λPλQ [(∀x :: Thing) (P (x) ⊃ Q (x))]
2. JravensK⇒ λx [(x :: Raven)]
3. JAll ravensK⇒ λQ [(∀x :: Thing) ((x :: Raven) ⊃ Q (x))]
⇒ λQ [(∀x :: (Thing • Raven)) ((x :: Raven) ⊃ Q (x))]
⇒ λQ [(∀x :: Raven) ((x :: Raven) ⊃ Q (x))]
⇒ λQ [(∀x :: Raven) ((x :: true) ⊃ Q (x))]
⇒ λQ [(∀x :: Raven) (Q (x))]
4. JareK⇒ λx [P (x :: Thing)]
5. JblackK⇒ λx[(black(x :: Physical))]
6. Jare blackK⇒ λx[(black(x :: Physical))]
7. JAll ravens are blackK⇒ (∀x :: Raven)(black(x :: Physical))
⇒ (∀x :: (Raven • Physical))(black(x ))
⇒ (∀x :: Raven)(black(x ))
Let us now consider the logically equivalent hypothesis H2, namely that All non-black
things are not ravens:
(25) 1. JAllK⇒ λPλQ [(∀x :: Thing) (P (x) ⊃ Q (x))]
2. Jnon− blackK⇒ λx[(¬black(x :: Physical)]
3. JAll non− blackK⇒ λQ[(∀x :: Thing)(¬black(x :: Physical) ⊃ Q (x))]
⇒ λQ[(∀x :: (Thing • Physical))(¬black(x :: Physical) ⊃ Q (x))]
⇒ λQ[(∀x :: Physical)(¬black(x :: Physical) ⊃ Q (x))]
⇒ λQ[(∀x :: Physical)(¬black(x ) ⊃ Q (x))]
4. JareK⇒ λPλx [P (x :: Thing)]
5. Jnon− ravensK⇒ λx[(¬(x :: Raven))]
6. Jare non− ravensK⇒ λx[(¬(x :: Raven))]
7. JAll non− black are non− ravensK
⇒ (∀x :: Physical)(¬black(x )) ⊃ ¬(x :: Raven))
⇒ (∀x :: (Raven • Physical))(¬black(x )) ⊃ ¬(x :: Raven))
⇒ (∀x :: Raven)(¬black(x ) ⊃ ¬(x :: Raven))
⇒ (∀x :: Raven)(¬black(x ) ⊃ ¬true)
⇒ (∀x :: Raven)(false ∨ black(x ))
⇒ (∀x :: Raven)(black(x ))
Note that in this situation the widest scope variable x remains to be of type Physical
until the last step (25.7) where the unification (Raven • Physical) casts x to a specific
Physical object, namely Raven. What matters for us here is that in a formal semantics
embedded with types from a strongly-typed ontology both All ravens are black and
its logically equivalent All non-black things are not ravens turn out to be equivalent
not only in content, but also in form, where the logical formulation of both is (∀x
:: Raven)(black(x )), and thus there is no ‘paradox’ of the ravens since the logically
equivalent hypotheses H1 and H2 are now confirmed (and disconfirmed) by the same
observations!
4 Where Formal Semantics Can (Should?) Go
In this section we show how the embedding of ontological concepts in our predicates
can help us tackle some well-known challenges in the semantics of natural language.
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4.1 Lexical Disambiguation
For now we have been assuming single type assignments to the variables of our pred-
icates, e.g. black(x :: Physical), beautiful(x :: Entity), etc., as it was implicitly
assumed that the predicate in question has been disambiguated–that is, that a spe-
cific meaning of the predicate has been selected. We will continue to do so where
the context is clear, although we will show now how lexical disambiguation itself is
conducted in our system, and that requires that we initially consider, for some terms,
a set of type assignments.
Let us consider the interpretation of the sentence in (26), where we will concentrate
on two senses of ‘party,’ i.e. we will assume that ‘party’ belongs to (at least) two
branches in our ontological structure, as shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Lexical ambiguity as multiple ontological types.
(26) JJon cancelled the partyK
⇒ (∃1Jon :: Thing)(∃a :: Activity)(∃1p :: {PoliticalGroup, RecreationalEvent})
(cancellation(a) ∧ subject(a, Jon :: Human)
∧ object(a, p :: Event))
Thus, initially, the types associated with ‘the party’ p is a set of all possible types
(again, for simplicity we assumed that ‘cancelled’ has been disambiguated where it
was determined that it is some activity the object of which is an object of type Event).
The type unifications concerning Jon are straightforward. The type unifications that
must occur for p are now a set of n pairs of type unifications, where n is the number
of possible meanings of p:
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(p :: {(Event • PoliticalGroup),(Event • RecreationalEvent)})
(p :: {⊥,RecreationalEvent})
(p :: {RecreationalEvent})
Thus, the initial set of types is reduced to a singleton and the ‘party’ that John
seems to have cancelled is the ‘recreational event’ meaning of ‘party.’ Note that if
‘cancelled’ in (26) was replaced by ‘assisted,’ where it is assumed that the object of
‘assistance’ can be a human or a social group, then the correct meaning of ‘party’
will also be selected, namely the meaning of the social (political) group. On the
other hand, if ‘cancelled’ where to be replaced by ‘promoted,’ then we would have a
genuinely ambiguous statement, since one can ‘promote’ a political group, as well as
a recreational event, as illustrated by (27).
(27) JJon promoted the partyK
⇒ (∃1Jon :: Thing)(∃a :: Activity)(∃1p :: {PoliticalGroup, RecreationalEvent})
(promotion(a) ∧ subject(a, Jon :: Human)
∧ object(a, p :: Entity))
Assuming that any Entity can be promoted, and in the absence of any additional
information (and thus additional type constraints), both meanings of ‘party’ remain
to be equally plausible.
4.2 Metonomy, Copredication, and Salient Meanings
Consider the sentence in (28), where two senses of ‘book’ are assumed to be used in
the same context, the informational content sense of book (when being read) and the
physical object sense (when being burned):
(28) Jon read the book and then he burned it.
In Asher and Pustejovsky (2005), it is argued that this is an example of what they
term copredication; where incompatible predicates are applied to the same type of
object. It is argued that in (29), for example, ‘book’ must have what is called a dot
type, which is a structured object that in a sense carries the ‘informational content’
sense (which is referenced when it is being read), as well as the ‘physical object’
sense (which is referenced when it is being burned). Elaborate machinery is then
introduced to ‘pick out’ the right sense in the right context, and all in a well-typed
compositional logic. But this approach presupposes that one can enumerate, a priori ,
all possible uses of the word ‘book’ in ordinary language. More to the point, we
believe that what is termed ‘copredication’ is not different, in essence, from what is
known as metonymy, as in both cases we are trying to either ‘pick-up’ (i) a hidden
essence/sense of some object; or (ii) some hidden (i.e. unstated) relation between
some objects in the discourse under consideration. To illustrate this point further, let
us first consider the interpretation of Jon bought and studied Das Kapital :
(29) JJon bought and studied Das KapitalK
⇒ (∃1Jon :: Thing)(∃1DasKapital :: Book)(∃a1 :: Activity)(∃a2 :: Activity)
(studying(a1) ∧ subject(a, Jon :: Human)
∧ object(a1, DasKapital :: InformationalMaterial)) ∧
(buying(a2) ∧ subject(a, Jon :: Human)
∧ object(a1, DasKapital :: Physical))
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That is, Jon bought a book that he also studied, where the object of the buying
activity must be an object of type Physical, and the object of a studying is some In-
formationalMaterial. The type unifications of Jon and the (object of buying) Physical
book DasKapital are straightforward:
(Jon :: (Human • Thing)) → (Jon :: Thing)
(DasKapital :: (Physical • Book)) → (DasKapital :: Book)
However, the object of the studying activity, which is a Book, must be an Infor-
mationalMaterial object when being read. For these two types unify the most salient
relation between Book and InformationalMaterial that is picked-up, introducing in the
process a new variable infoc that is related to a book: hasContent(DasKapital ,
infoc). The final translation is thus that given by (30).
(30) JJon bought and studied Das KapitalK
⇒ (∃1Jon :: Human)(∃1DasKapital :: Book)
(∃a1 :: Activity)(∃a2 :: Activity) (∃infoc :: InformationalMaterial)
(studying(a1) ∧ subject(a, Jon) ∧ object(a, DasKapital)
∧ (buying(a2) ∧ subject(a, Jon) ∧ object(a, DasKapital)
∧ hasContent(DasKapital, infoc))
That is, Jon bought and studied Das Kapital describes a situation where there is a
unique object named Jon, an object of type Human, and some Book titled DasKapital
(that Jon bought), and where DasKapital has the InformationalMaterial infoc (that
Jon studied).
It is important to note at this stage that hidden (and implicitly assumed) informa-
tion is either obtained by straightforward type unification or, when all attempts fail,
by picking up some salient property or relation between the objects in the discourse.
On the other hand, unwanted meanings (as in lexical disambiguation, or removing
some ambiguities related to nominal modification) are obtained when certain type
unifications fail.
Still with respect to the important point that we like to make here that copredi-
cation, the name given for the phenomenon exemplified by (31), is not much different
from what is known by metonymy, in that type unification is the process by which
an indirect reference or some salient relation are discovered, consider for example the
following:
(31) JThe omelet wants a beerK
⇒ (∃1oml :: Omelet)(∃b :: Beer)(∃e :: Event)
(wanting(e) ∧ subject(e, oml :: Human) ∧ object(e, b :: Thing))
In this case, resolving the situation of ‘what is wanted’ is quite simple: the object of
wanting is an object of type Thing, and more specifically, a Beer, which works very
well. However, it is the subject of the wanting that seems to be the problem: ‘want’
expects a Human subject, but we found an object of type Omelet. Clearly, these two
types must somehow be reconciled. Since no subsumption relation exists between
these types, the only way they can be reconciled is by finding some salient relation
between them. As it turns out, there is a salient relationship between a Human and
Food (a supertype of Omelet), namely the eat relation, that will necessarily introduce
an (implicit) object of type Human. Thus,
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(32) JThe omelet wants a beerK
⇒ (∃1oml :: Omelet)(∃b :: Beer)(∃e :: Event)(∃a :: Activity)(∃p :: Human)
(eating(a) ∧ subject(a, p) ∧ object(a, oml)
(wanting(e) ∧ subject(e, p) ∧ object(e, b))
4.3 Ontological Types and the Copula
It is widely accepted in formal semantics that there are two senses for the copula
‘is’ in natural language. The two senses, generally attributed to Frege, are the ‘is
of identity,’ exemplified by (33) and the ‘is of predication,’ exemplified by (34) (see
Mendelsohn, 1987).
(33) Billie the Kid is William H. Bonney.
(34) Billie the Kid is an outlaw.
While (Mendelsohn, 1987) rejects the notion of two senses of ‘is,’ and correctly so, in
our opinion, his treatment of ‘is’ boils down to considering ‘identity’ as a special case
of predication, where uniqueness of identity is guaranteed by some special axioms to
the theory. Ironically, Mendelsohn’s proposal was inspired by the work of Sommers
(1969), whose ideas on types and ontology (Sommers, 1963) are very much in line
with the proposal we make here.
However, we believe that those proposals are lacking in that the ambiguity is not
due to the flexibility of the copula ‘is,’ but in that fact that this copula can be highly
polymorphic and can therefore trigger different interpretations depending on the types
of objects that are flanked on both sides. To be sure, even in the case of (proper)
names, there is no ‘real’ identity, except in the vacuous case of ‘x is x ’ since 7 + 9, is
not exactly ‘identical’ to
√
256, for example, as illustrated by (35).
(35) Mary taught her little brother that 7 + 9 = 16.
⊃ Mary taught her little brother that 7 + 9 =
√
256.
What matters to us here is to demonstrate how the copula ‘is’ is treated in our
system. For us, ‘is’ is a polymorphic function that has the general template is(x :: S,
y :: T) where the final interpretation is a function of the types S and T and their type
unification. That is, in cases where there is no subsumption relationship between S
and T, the copula ‘is’ will introduce a salient relation between the two types. In (36)
we have some common examples that involve very general and abstract types, where
HasProp(x, y) means x has the property y , INPro(x, y) means x is in (or is going
through) the process y , DOES(x, y) means x (often) does y , and INSt(x, y) means
x is in the state y .
For example, (36a) says that Liz has the property of fame, while (36c) says that
the property of fame is desirable, etc.
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(36) a. Liz is famous
⇒ (∃1Liz :: Human)(∃p :: Property)(fame(p) ∧ HasProp(Liz, p))
b. Jon is aging
⇒ (∃1Jon :: Human)(∃p :: Process)(aging(p) ∧ InPro(Jon, p))
c. Aging is inevitable
⇒(∀p :: Process)(aging(p) ⊃
(∃p :: Property)(inevitability(e) ∧ HasProp(p, e)))
d. Fame is desirable
⇒(∀f :: Process)(fame(p) ⊃
(∃d :: Property)(desirability(d) ∧ HasProp(f, d)))
e. Olga is a dancer
⇒ (∃1Olga :: Human)(∃a :: Activity)(dancing(a) ∧ DOES(Olga, a))
f. Sheba is dead
⇒ (∃1Sheba :: Human)(∃s :: State)(death(s) ∧ INSt(Sheba, s))
5 On the Nature of Ontological Structure
Throughout this paper we have assumed the existence of some ontological structure,
an ontological structure the types of which are assumed to be embedded in predicates
(the properties of and the relations between objects of various types). However,
a valid question that one might ask is the following: how does one arrive at this
ontological structure that implicitly underlies all that we say in everyday discourse?
One plausible answer is the (seemingly circular) suggestion that the semantic analysis
of natural language should itself be used to uncover this structure. In this regard, we
strongly agree with Dummett (1991) who states:
We must not try to resolve the metaphysical questions first, and then
construct a meaning-theory in light of the answers. We should investigate
how our language actually functions, and how we can construct a workable
systematic description of how it functions; the answers to those questions
will then determine the answers to the metaphysical ones.
What this suggests, and correctly so, in our opinion, is that in our effort to understand
the complex and intimate relationship between ordinary language and everyday (com-
monsense) knowledge, one could, as Bateman (1995) has also suggested, “use language
as a tool for uncovering the semiotic ontology of commonsense,” since language is the
only theory we have of everyday knowledge. To alleviate this seeming circularity (in
assuming this ontological structure in our semantic analysis; while at the same time
suggesting that semantic analysis of language should itself be used to uncover this
ontological structure), we suggest performing semantic analysis from the ground up,
assuming a minimal (almost a trivial and basic) ontology, building up the ontology
as we go guided by the results of the semantic analysis.
The advantages of this approach are: (i) the ontology thus constructed as a result
of this process would not be invented, as is the case in most approaches to ontology
(e.g., Guarino, 1995; Lenat & Guha, 1990; Sowa, 1995), but would instead be dis-
covered from what is in fact implicitly assumed in our use of language in everyday
discourse; (ii) the semantics of several natural language phenomena should as a result
become trivial, since the semantic analysis was itself the source of the underlying
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knowledge structures (in a sense, one could say that the semantics would have been
done before we even started!)
Another promising technique that can be used to ‘boot-up’ this ontological struc-
ture is performing some corpus analysis to initially obtain sets of monadic predicates
that seem to be (sensibly) used in the predication of some very general types (e.g.,
Artifact, Event, Physical, State, etc.). A subset relationship analysis can then be used
to discover the hidden hierarchical structure. A similar approach has been suggested
in Saba (2006).
6 Concluding Remarks
Most of the challenges in the semantics of natural language seem to be related to the
phenomenon of the ‘missing text’–that is, text that is almost never explicitly stated
but is implicitly assumed as ‘shared’ background knowledge. As Hobbs (1985) has
suggested, however, challenges in the semantic analysis of natural language can be-
come more tractable if our formal semantics was embedded with some theory of the
commonsense world, at least as we talk about it in our everyday discourse (common-
sense knowledge).
In this paper, we suggested one such method, a method that rectifies what we
believe was an oversight in formal semantics, namely distinguishing between two fun-
damentally different types of concepts: (i) ontological concepts, that correspond to
types in a strongly-typed ontology; and (ii) logical concepts, that correspond to the
properties of and the relations between objects of various ontological types. One
method to distinguish between the two was vaguely suggested by early work in the
metaphysics of natural languages (Sommers, 1963), and is also related to some very
powerful ideas put forward by Cocchiarella (2001), where he makes a strong argument
for a new ‘logic as language’–a logic that has ontological content where one can clearly
distinguish between what he calls first-intension and second-intension concepts. We
have tested our approach on a number of challenges in semantics, where we suggested
clear and uniform treatment of a number of phenomena–phenomena that are usually
treated by proposing often incompatible solutions.
Several linguistic phenomena, some of which have been relegated to intensional-
ity (e.g., intensional verbs), or to reasoning with abstract objects (such as ‘Jon is
wise’ should follow from ‘exercising is wise’ and ‘Jon is exercising ’), or to compound
nominals, quantifier scope ambiguity, etc., were not dealt with in this paper, as that
would require some minor extension to our formalism and would thus extend the
paper considerably. These and a more detailed presentation of some of the subjects
covered in this paper are forthcoming. Of course, much is left to be done, refined, and
formally defined, and mainly the ‘discovery’ of that ontological structure that seems
to be implicit in everything we say in everyday discourse.
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